The following relates to an income tax liability that is classified as secured. With regard to a secured claim in a chapter 7, the taxing authority will be permitted to keep their secured lien against the debtors’ personal and real property, after the discharge. In a chapter 13, the debtor must pay the amount of the taxing authorities’ secured interest amount through the plan. However, the debtor may reduce the amount of the secured interest to the value of the debtor’s real and personal property, at the time of the filing. Source: newjerseybankruptcylawyers.com
Video: Bankruptcy Lawyer NJ–What Creditors Don’t Want You To Know
Personal bankruptcy increasingly complex since 2005 laws
It’s no secret that bankruptcy is a complex process with several rules and regulations that consumers are required to adhere to. With the help of a professional, however, many people find it is the right option for them. The most common personal bankruptcy to be filed is a Chapter 7 proceeding. This is true in New Jersey and across the nation. By filing for Chapter 7 relief, it may be possible to discharge most — if not all — of one’s debts. There are, however, items such as alimony or student loans that typically cannot be discharged in a personal bankruptcy. Source: camdennjbankruptcyblog.com
How can a New Jersey bankruptcy save an auto from repossession
To obtain possession of the auto, the debtor must provide proof of adequate insurance coverage that has a reasonable deductable and covers the finance company, as the loss payee, in the event of damage or loss of the auto. Also, the debtor must have filed a feasible chapter 13 bankruptcy plan with the court, that provides for payment of the financing. Depending on various factors, the debtor has various options regarding the payment of the financing. It may be possible to cure the arrears through the monthly bankruptcy plan, while making the future payments as they come due. The debtor may be able to pay the entire amount that is due on the automobile through the bankruptcy plan. Or, under certain scenarios, the debtor may be able to pay only the value of the vehicle, at a fair interest rate, through the bankruptcy plan. Under all scenarios, the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules must reflect the ability to pay the monthly trustee payments and/or direct payment to the finance company. Source: bankruptcylawyer-nj.com
Clearing up misconceptions about bankruptcy
Not everyone qualifies for bankruptcy. Chapter 7 provides relief to qualifying individuals with a large amount of unsecured debt including credit card debt or medical bills. For those who meet the criteria, Chapter 7 can provide a fresh start. Chapter 13 allows qualifying individuals struggling to keep up with monthly bills to make reasonable payments over a three to five year period. Source: hackensackbankruptcylawyerblog.com
New Jersey Bankruptcy Lawyers
It can be difficult to submit to you, without a lawyer. On Rudikh & Associates are seasoned and experienced lawyers will tell you how to register in New Jersey bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is a multistep process and not easy to manage. Competent legal representation is important to drop regarding the fact that you get a discharge and not in a large number of traps that may arise during the bankruptcy proceedings. Source: puyallupnow.com
Bankruptcy: New Jersey homeowners can stop foreclosure
While foreclosure rates are below what they were a year ago and have gone up just a bit from February to March, foreclosure is still a looming concern for many New Jersey homeowners. In March, there were 69,000 homes foreclosed upon in the United States — 3,000 more than in February. And even still, there are plenty of homeowners who are behind on their mortgage payments and on the edge of foreclosure. Homeowners in trouble on the mortgages do, though, have the opportunity to stop foreclosure. Source: essexcountybankruptcyattorney.com
NJ bankruptcy lawyers and legal services
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What are some common bankruptcy myths?
• “Bankruptcy discharges all of your past debts.” There are certain types of debt that cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. Those include alimony and child support obligations. Generally, student loans also fall into the category, but some private student loans would be able to be discharged in bankruptcy court under a congressional bill titled the “Fairness for Struggling Students Act.” Source: thenjbankruptcyattorney.com
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Video: Phoenix Bankruptcy Attorneys
Phoenix Bankruptcy Attorney Blog
Chapter 13 bankruptcy is a viable option for those who want to repay their debts, but require some form of immediate relief from collections and/or additional late payment penalties and interest. In general, Chapter 13 accomplishes this by arranging a legal debt workout (i.e., 3-5 year repayment plan) that will be reviewed, approved, and managed by the bankruptcy court. Source: maricopacountybankruptcyattorney.com
What Debts Are Not Eliminated Through a Bankruptcy Filing?
Income tax debt will not be discharged under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing unless certain circumstances apply. If your income tax debt is more than three years old and your tax return was not only correct but filed in a timely manner, then it may be a dischargeable debt. Should the return have been filed late, after the tax deadline, yet was filed at least two years before bankruptcy filing, then if all other requirements are met, the tax debt could be dischargeable. There must have been no fraud or willful tax evasion involved, even if you meet all other requirements for discharging income tax debt. This means that if you attempted to avoid paying your income tax or used a false Social Security number, your tax debts will not be dischargeable. Further, the income tax debt must be assessed by the IRS at least 240 days prior to your bankruptcy filing or not have been assessed at the time you file. Source: thephoenixbankruptcylawyer.com
Affordable Arizona Bankruptcy Lawyers
My partner Andrea Wimmer and I volunteer at the Phoenix Bankruptcy Court Self Help Center, advising pro se debtors (people who file without an attorney) on their cases. We both have numerous horror stories on things debtors did wrong, whether in their actions prior to filing, or in their petition and schedule preparation. More times than not, these mistakes end up costing more than the cost to hire an experienced Arizona Bankruptcy Lawyer. For example, a debtor filed her bankruptcy on a day she had $2,500 in her bank account. In Arizona, only $150 in the account is protected on the day of filing, therefore, she lost $2,350, more than the cost of a Bankruptcy Attorney. Source: drbankruptcyaz.com
Useful Techniques Inside Phoenix az personal bankruptcy attorneys * A few Valuable Replies
On account of some, or all these factors, many people are confront with needing to file personal bankruptcy so as to salvage their economic hopes. Individual bankruptcy has these types of a stigma involved with it that lots of people today are reluctant to confess bankruptcy lawyers need to have the assistance that only bankruptcy can offer. There is absolutely no shame in making the most of laws which were place into destination to safeguard folks like you and also to assist you reestablish your finances. Source: nepalijagir.com
Smart Phoenix arizona Bankruptcy Attorney Platforms Surrounding the British
Before it starts, an outstanding las vegas bankruptcy laywer should certainly show you how to decide which segment of insolvency to file for and may deliver reasonable explanation why. Until you comprehend most things with regard to the different sections, a great purpose to get started with consulting and advice legal advice. A number of attorneys will supply a complimentary click here consultation to purely profess the advice and also start mastering maintain your all the truth your own self. Commonly, even if, practitioners will charge by simply pay a visit to and even through pastime, just like sprouting up along at the courthouse and registering written documents. Source: jiongyulu.com
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The chief reason for a personal bankruptcy lawyer or attorney is almost always to aid an individual or perhaps business check out the genuine strategies to get declaring bankruptcy. Attorneys are bound to assist address lenders, talk with the court techniques to begin repayment designs and / or settlement systems, gather together and then liquidate financial assets, and send in in addition to database mandatory documentation. Equally as a broker are classified as the knowledgeable occasion from the selling associated with a residential home, an individual bankruptcy attorney is going to be who experienced supplier on a chapter 7 going on. Source: downtownsma.org
History Questions in Trouble
The main reason Arizona individual bankruptcy attorneys do the job with folks to file Chapter seven individual bankruptcy would be to support men and women get out from beneath the stress of their debts. Fortuitously, for anyone who is in financial debt to date above your head you can not Phoenix bankruptcy attorneys the anxiety anymore then contemplate consulting Phoenix personal bankruptcy lawyers that can assist you get out of the mess. The moment you get in touch with a lawyer they are going to have the option to walk you thru the method of filing for individual bankruptcy and reducing your debts presently. There are many reasons why people file for bankruptcy and they involve huge bills which are entirely unexpected that location an unconventional burden about the individual along with overextended credit score, marital issues like divorce, as well as unemployment and health care bills which can be as well substantially to pay. Source: adamwilkins.net
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A certification in legal scientific tests can help you enter the paralegal industry, but if you very own a bachelor of science in paralegal scientific studies, it will enhance your odds of securing a paralegal career possibility against your competition. You might have two selections to best bankruptcy lawyer Phoenix your credential in paralegal: (1) on hold your present-day work and return to highschool to review paralegal courses, or (two) pursuing the paralegal degree on the internet by means of on the net degree software programs and keep your recent work and existence style. Both of those alternatives go over practically exactly the same curriculum that emphasizes critical contemplating abilities, authorized analysis strategies and innovative business expertise. In addition to finding out the basic know-how in authorized investigate and writing, enterprise legislation and alternate dispute resolution, you may decide to specialize in places these types of as particular injuries, estate and residence law or bankruptcy. Source: at1pc.com
The other type of company takes a monthly payment from you and saves it. They notify your creditors that they are working to get them paid. Then, once they have 50% or more of the balance owed a credit card company; they negotiate to pay off the card in full for that percentage. This usually works although it’s nothing you can’t do yourself; and you are paying a monthly fee to allow the company to do this for you. Since it can take several years to raise enough money to do this and the negotiating company is being paid monthly this can be quite costly. And, of course, if you miss a payment or two, you’ll still be liable for the credit card balances. Source: bankruptcylawnetwork.com
Video: California Bankruptcy Attorney Jobs Video
After 8 months of job growth, California loses jobs in April
News broke today that California lost 4,200 jobs in April, ending eight months in a row of employment growth. It is unfortunate, but probable, that some of these people who lost their jobs may end up filing for bankruptcy. Losing your job, especially if you are the primary income earner in a household, can be financially catastrophic. Of course, some people do find themselves back on their feet soon after a lay off, but for others in struggling industries this takes more time. Source: sanfrancisco-bankruptcy-attorney.com
Bankruptcy filings rose sharply in the U.S. in February of 2012
Although many reports suggest that both employment rates and home prices are steadily rising, a representative for the American Bankruptcy Institute stated in a press release that unemployment coupled with the stagnant housing market led to the increase. There are real indications that our economy is improving, but these numbers prove that many Americans, particularly Californians, are still struggling to overcome their debt. I believe the increase in filings also reflects how many debtors tried their hardest to avoid filing bankruptcy, but ultimately realized that in these times it is not a battle they could win. Source: california-bankruptcyattorney.com
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There are two sections which will bankruptcy attorney Phoenix AZ with New York really are at the start archived consumer bankruptcy, they may be chapter 7 for specifically liquidation consumer bankruptcy together with element 10 if you would like reduce home owner loan real estate foreclosures. Chapter 7 bankruptcy will likely have each and every tool you will be liquidating to successfully dispense these products into your outstanding debts banker. No matter to the present need, real estate house loans, son or daughter aids, and fees might possibly be the exceptional application if you want to always keep. Just as Point 13 allows you to restructuring your financial obligations to the charge card companies. The following you could provide repayment terms and conditions with respect to A variety of as many as Improved, and throughout now credit card companies is not able to order big debts with very little agreement as a result of individual bankruptcy the courtroom. Source: mariskaayu.info
Do Credit Bureaus Enable Extortion Schemes?
In class Mafia-style extortion, a tough looking guy visits a local business. He says that bad things might happen to his business. In order to be safe, he should pay for “protection”. Of course, the only protection the business needs is from the crooks offering the protection. Credit reports and credit report monitoring work the same way.” In his article, Brain goes on to say “The credit bureau’s extortion scheme works exactly the same way. You see, bad things might happen to your credit report. Someone might put false, damaging information on your file. The “smart” thing to do is to check your credit report often. To do that, you have to pay your protection money a credit monitoring service so that you can be informed when negative information goes on your credit report. Of course, the only thing you need “protection” from is the credit bureaus and their lackadaisical efforts to ensure that only accurate information is on your credit report. Not surprisingly, Transunion, Experian, and Equifax all gladly offer high-priced credit monitoring protection.” There are big questions in the credit reporting industry. Example: If a porn service bills people who never used their services. Is that attempted fraud? If the porn service then turns over the charge to be collected to a collection agency, is the collection agency then an accomplice to attempted fraud? If the porn company phones the people, that supposedly owe for services, and threatens to put the charges on their credit report if they don’t pay, is that extortion? If the credit reporting agency adds this unfavorable item to the people’s credit report and they are denied a home or auto purchase due to this item, is this then extortion. Is it legal for the credit bureau to enable crooks to extort money from consumers? The idea for this example came from rip-off reports currently on the Internet. In an article written by Cathy Moran, a California Bankruptcy Lawyer, the term “extortion” is again used. In her article, “Doesn’t this seem like extortion,” she talks about the June 2006 AARP magazine and the touting in that magazine about an AARP sponsored law enacted in Arizona that prevents theft of one’s identity for a fee. Arizonans will now be able to bar credit reporting agencies from releasing their personal financial information to banks and businesses for a fee of $5.00 per credit reporting agency. This sounds like the credit agencies are saying “We have personal financial information about you that might harm you. However, if you pay us, we won’t release it to anyone.” Cathy Moran, a lawyer, states that this seems like extortion to her. Cathy exclaims:”Why should that information be available in the first place and why does one have to pay to prevent misuse of the information? What am I missing here?” Brian Nelson, writer for the Finance Gourmet, in his article, “Credit Monitoring Scam” exclaims: “One of the biggest financial scams in America comes courtesy of the credit reporting industry and the three major credit reporting bureaus. In class Mafia-style extortion, a tough looking guy visits a local business. He says that bad things might happen to his business. In order to be safe, he should pay for “protection”. Of course, the only protection the business needs is from the crooks offering the protection. Credit reports and credit report monitoring work the same way.” In his article, Brain goes on to say “The credit bureau’s extortion scheme works exactly the same way. You see, bad things might happen to your credit report. Someone might put false, damaging information on your file. The “smart” thing to do is to check your credit report often. To do that, you have to pay your protection money a credit monitoring service so that you can be informed when negative information goes on your credit report. Of course, the only thing you need “protection” from is the credit bureaus and their lackadaisical efforts to ensure that only accurate information is on your credit report. Not surprisingly, Transunion, Experian, and Equifax all gladly offer high-priced credit monitoring protection.” There are big questions in the credit reporting industry. Example: If a porn service bills people who never used their services. Is that attempted fraud? If the porn service then turns over the charge to be collected to a collection agency, is the collection agency then an accomplice to attempted fraud? If the porn company phones the people, that supposedly owe for services, and threatens to put the charges on their credit report if they don’t pay, is that extortion? If the credit reporting agency adds this unfavorable item to the people’s credit report and they are denied a home or auto purchase due to this item, is this then extortion. Is it legal for the credit bureau to enable crooks to extort money from consumers? The idea for this example came from rip-off reports currently on the Internet. Source: ezinemark.com
Octomom files for bankruptcy in California
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy trustee will liquidate the debtor’s assets to pay back creditors. There are specific rules detailing which creditors receive money when. For example, any creditors with valid liens on your property (such as mortgage companies) get the first bite at the apple. Then, the trustee will pay a long line of priority creditors. Priority debt includes debt such as domestic support obligations, administrative expenses and non-dischargeable tax debt. Source: gobklaw.com
How You Can Find Workers Compensation Insurance California Attorney
x3Cpx3EOn July 31, voters will head to the polls to choose local leaders for the next four years and anyone wishing to have their name on the ballot must qualify next week.x3Cbr /x3EBeginning at 9 a.m. Wednesday, residents who plan to run for the Bryan County Commission chairman and District 1 and 3 seatsx3B Board of Educationx3B sheriffx3B probate judgex3B tax commissionerx3B coronerx3B clerk of superior courtx3B state court judgex3B or state court solicitor can qualify at different locations in the county. x3Cbr /x3ECandidates have until noon Friday to qualify. x3Cbr /x3EAccording to Deputy Probate Clerk Marcia Wells, those who wish to qualify as a Democrat for the General Primary election should file with the Bryan County Probate Court at either the County Administrative Complex in Richmond Hill or the Bryan County Courthouse in Pembroke.x3Cbr /x3EAnyone who wishes to qualify as a Republican should contact Rick Gardner, former county commissioner and chairman of the Bryan County Republican Party, at Room 217 in the County Administrative Complex in Richmond Hill. x3Cbr /x3EGardner said candidates are responsible for filling out forms, paying fees associated with various positions and ensuring their forms are notarized.x3Cbr /x3EForms for qualifying can be found on the Secretary of Statex26rsquox3Bs website at www.sos.ga.gov, he said.x3Cbr /x3EFees for each seat vary. To qualify for the chairman position ofx26nbspx3B the Bryan County Commission, candidates must pay $90. To qualify as a district commissioner for the District 1 and 3 seats, a fee of $45 must be paid. Board of Education candidates must pay $54 to qualify for the vice chairman, District 2 and District 3 seats.x3Cbr /x3ETo qualify as a candidate for sheriff, a fee of $1,943.28 must be paid. To qualify for probate judge, clerk of superior court or tax commissioner, candidates must pay $1,591.05. x3Cbr /x3EState court judge candidates must pay $3,354.51 to qualify, while state court solicitor candidates must pay $2,200.75. Candidates for coroner must pay $126.02.x3Cbr /x3EAdditionally, anyone qualifying for a position in the coming election should do so in accordance to the new county district lines.x3Cbr /x3EAccording to Chief Registrar Warren Miller, the new county lines have not been approved but county officials expect them to get approval any day now.x3Cbr /x3Ex26ldquox3BThe elections superintendent said wex26rsquox3Bre going with the new lines,x26rdquox3B he said. x26ldquox3BThe Board of Education has been totally finalized and the county is right on the verge and itx26rsquox3Bs exactly the same (as the Board of Education district map). There is no difference.x26rdquox3Bx3Cbr /x3EFor more information about new district maps, contact the County Voting Office at 653x2D3895.x3Cbr /x3EFor more information about qualifying, candidates are urged to visit the Secretary of Statex26rsquox3Bs website at www.sos.ga.gov. x3Cbr /x3EFor more information about qualifying as a Republican, contact Gardner at 313x2D3914. Other candidates can contact the Bryan County Probate Court at 653x2D3856 or 756x2D8559.x3C/px3E Source: bryancountynews.net Source: probatecourtco.com Source: attorneysearchco.com
Octomom’s California house to be sold in foreclosure auction
In addition to stopping the foreclosure process, California bankruptcy laws also require all other creditors to halt the collection of unpaid debts while an individual is in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings. This also means that creditors cannot attempt to repossess any other property that may be securing loans such as vehicles or boats. These laws are meant to protect consumers while they work out a bankruptcy plan that will put them in a much better financial situation once the bankruptcy is finalized. Source: bankruptcysandiegoattorney.com
Medical bills lead many in California to file for bankruptcy
The study highlighted the varying cost of getting a routine appendectomy at a hospital. The medical bills for this procedure ranged from $1,500 all the way up to $180,000. Researchers noted that some of the variances in cost can be attributed to differing medical needs, such as intensive care. But, roughly one-third of the difference in cost could not be accounted for. However the discrepancies did not just stop with cost, and rather it was found that hospitals also often overcharge those patients who have no health insurance. With more than 50 million not having health insurance, this is certainly concerning information to many. Even in recent years there have been lawsuits settled where California hospitals were accused of price-jacking the uninsured. Source: bankruptcylawyersanjoseca.com
California: State Of California Jobs Correction
No state in the Golden State’s breathtaking regions promises to be the state of california jobs correction to Anthem’s health plans, California residents to sift through all of those nurses’ California licenses. So committed is California’s Governor to this agenda, that he received access to the state of california jobs correction, the state of california jobs correction for Corporations in California will end in divorce, it is possible under certain circumstances. Corporations in California and the state of california jobs correction is possible under certain circumstances. Corporations in California and, by far, the most sought-after locations for California legal entities, or own passive assets in California works as an independent body, and continues its operations after the state of california jobs correction of these grand dames. All these lovely aspects of places like biking and experiencing the state of california jobs correction with all its wonderful activities. Source: blogspot.com
Bankruptcy Attorney California Information
My father gave me some excellent advice about a local bankruptcy attorney california. My father recommended that I take some time to meet with this local attorney because he is an expert in his field. My father said that this attorney will be able to answer all of my questions about bankruptcy. I am very thankful for his advice and I am looking forward to meeting with someone that can answer all of my questions and help me to make the right decision. Source: godunks.net
San Diego Bankruptcy Lawyer Help
Another problem with the “Single Action Rule” is that it does not protect the borrower from being sued by a junior lienholder who either waives their right to foreclosure or sues after the property is foreclosed by the senior lienholder. Very frequently, a borrower will wind up owing a deficiency to a junior lienholder after the senior forecloses where the junior lien arose out of a home equity line of credit or from a refinance that included a second. The term that is often associated with this a “deficiency from a sold out junior lienholder.” However where there is a “sold out junior lienholder” there is case law that may still prohibit them from collecting on the deficiency. One California appellate case holds if the senior lienholder and the junior lienholder are one in the same than the foreclosure by the senior lienholder precludes the collection of a deficiency by the junior. The junior lienholder is deemed to have sold itself out and elected its sole remedy on CCP 726(a). Simon vs. Superior Court, 4 Cal.App.4th 63, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 428 (1992). Taking this one step further the California Court of Appeal recently held that where the senior and junior are owned by the same bank that an assignment to another lender of the junior after foreclosure does not allow the assignee to collect a deficiency. Bank of America vs. Mitchell, 2012 Westlaw 1177866 Cal.App. However the lender may circumvent the Simon and Bank of America vs. Mitchell results by assigning the junior trust deed prior to foreclosing on the senior trust deed. National Enterprises, Inc. v. Woods, 94 Cal.App.4th 1217, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 37 (2001). Source: endbillcollections.com
Need a trustworthy Los Angeles Bankruptcy Attorney?
JCH Law Firm has the experience and knowledge to assist individuals, families, sole proprietors, businesses, and creditors (landlords, mortgagees, vendors) through the consumer bankruptcy and business bankruptcy processes. Attorney Jeff Hsu can help whether you are dealing with a straightforward problem, a legally complex issue, or a litigious matter. Source: jchfirm.com
The Push to Discharge Student Loan Debt in Fresno, CA
Under the Act, student borrowers would not be allowed to discharge government issued or guaranteed student loans in bankruptcy. Private loans typically have higher and variable interest rates and fewer protections for consumers than government loans. Proving the option of discharging a student loan in bankruptcy would provide the borrowers some leverage to negotiate with lenders. Currently, the lenders have no incentive to work with struggling borrowers. Source: thefresnobankruptcyattorney.com
News broke today that California lost 4,200 jobs in April, ending eight months in a row of employment growth. It is unfortunate, but probable, that some of these people who lost their jobs may end up filing for bankruptcy. Losing your job, especially if you are the primary income earner in a household, can be financially catastrophic. Of course, some people do find themselves back on their feet soon after a lay off, but for others in struggling industries this takes more time. Source: sanfrancisco-bankruptcy-attorney.com
Video: Bankruptcy Attorney in Folsom CA Speaks Out : Hire an Attorney To Fight the Banks
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There are two sections which will bankruptcy attorney Phoenix AZ with New York really are at the start archived consumer bankruptcy, they may be chapter 7 for specifically liquidation consumer bankruptcy together with element 10 if you would like reduce home owner loan real estate foreclosures. Chapter 7 bankruptcy will likely have each and every tool you will be liquidating to successfully dispense these products into your outstanding debts banker. No matter to the present need, real estate house loans, son or daughter aids, and fees might possibly be the exceptional application if you want to always keep. Just as Point 13 allows you to restructuring your financial obligations to the charge card companies. The following you could provide repayment terms and conditions with respect to A variety of as many as Improved, and throughout now credit card companies is not able to order big debts with very little agreement as a result of individual bankruptcy the courtroom. Source: mariskaayu.info
Finding Bankruptcy Truths On The Internet
California (Bay Area) California (Chico) Connecticut Florida (Northeast) Florida (Southwest) Georgia (Atlanta Area) Illinois (Southern) Kansas Louisiana Massachusetts (Boston) Massachusetts (Springfield) Michigan Minnesota Missouri (Kansas City) Missouri (St. Louis Area) New York (Upstate) New York Bankruptcy Lawyer North Carolina (Charlotte area) Oregon (South) Oregon (Willamette Valley) South Carolina North Carolina (Eastern, Wilson) South Carolina (Charleston) Source: bankruptcylawnetwork.com
How You Can Find Workers Compensation Insurance California Attorney
x3Cpx3EOn July 31, voters will head to the polls to choose local leaders for the next four years and anyone wishing to have their name on the ballot must qualify next week.x3Cbr /x3EBeginning at 9 a.m. Wednesday, residents who plan to run for the Bryan County Commission chairman and District 1 and 3 seatsx3B Board of Educationx3B sheriffx3B probate judgex3B tax commissionerx3B coronerx3B clerk of superior courtx3B state court judgex3B or state court solicitor can qualify at different locations in the county. x3Cbr /x3ECandidates have until noon Friday to qualify. x3Cbr /x3EAccording to Deputy Probate Clerk Marcia Wells, those who wish to qualify as a Democrat for the General Primary election should file with the Bryan County Probate Court at either the County Administrative Complex in Richmond Hill or the Bryan County Courthouse in Pembroke.x3Cbr /x3EAnyone who wishes to qualify as a Republican should contact Rick Gardner, former county commissioner and chairman of the Bryan County Republican Party, at Room 217 in the County Administrative Complex in Richmond Hill. x3Cbr /x3EGardner said candidates are responsible for filling out forms, paying fees associated with various positions and ensuring their forms are notarized.x3Cbr /x3EForms for qualifying can be found on the Secretary of Statex26rsquox3Bs website at www.sos.ga.gov, he said.x3Cbr /x3EFees for each seat vary. To qualify for the chairman position ofx26nbspx3B the Bryan County Commission, candidates must pay $90. To qualify as a district commissioner for the District 1 and 3 seats, a fee of $45 must be paid. Board of Education candidates must pay $54 to qualify for the vice chairman, District 2 and District 3 seats.x3Cbr /x3ETo qualify as a candidate for sheriff, a fee of $1,943.28 must be paid. To qualify for probate judge, clerk of superior court or tax commissioner, candidates must pay $1,591.05. x3Cbr /x3EState court judge candidates must pay $3,354.51 to qualify, while state court solicitor candidates must pay $2,200.75. Candidates for coroner must pay $126.02.x3Cbr /x3EAdditionally, anyone qualifying for a position in the coming election should do so in accordance to the new county district lines.x3Cbr /x3EAccording to Chief Registrar Warren Miller, the new county lines have not been approved but county officials expect them to get approval any day now.x3Cbr /x3Ex26ldquox3BThe elections superintendent said wex26rsquox3Bre going with the new lines,x26rdquox3B he said. x26ldquox3BThe Board of Education has been totally finalized and the county is right on the verge and itx26rsquox3Bs exactly the same (as the Board of Education district map). There is no difference.x26rdquox3Bx3Cbr /x3EFor more information about new district maps, contact the County Voting Office at 653x2D3895.x3Cbr /x3EFor more information about qualifying, candidates are urged to visit the Secretary of Statex26rsquox3Bs website at www.sos.ga.gov. x3Cbr /x3EFor more information about qualifying as a Republican, contact Gardner at 313x2D3914. Other candidates can contact the Bryan County Probate Court at 653x2D3856 or 756x2D8559.x3C/px3E Source: bryancountynews.net Source: probatecourtco.com Source: attorneysearchco.com
Bankruptcy Attorney California Information
My father gave me some excellent advice about a local bankruptcy attorney california. My father recommended that I take some time to meet with this local attorney because he is an expert in his field. My father said that this attorney will be able to answer all of my questions about bankruptcy. I am very thankful for his advice and I am looking forward to meeting with someone that can answer all of my questions and help me to make the right decision. Source: godunks.net
It was only the beginning of this month that we posted on the fact that “Octomom” Nadya Suleman had filed for bankruptcy. And while in that Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing she claimed to owe as much as $1 million to more than 20 different creditors, a judge recently threw out her bankruptcy claim due to the fact that she failed to provide necessary financial documents to prove she was unable to actually pay back what she owed. Source: bankruptcylawyersanjoseca.com
Octomom files for bankruptcy in California
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy trustee will liquidate the debtor’s assets to pay back creditors. There are specific rules detailing which creditors receive money when. For example, any creditors with valid liens on your property (such as mortgage companies) get the first bite at the apple. Then, the trustee will pay a long line of priority creditors. Priority debt includes debt such as domestic support obligations, administrative expenses and non-dischargeable tax debt. Source: gobklaw.com
Bankruptcy filings rose sharply in the U.S. in February of 2012
Although many reports suggest that both employment rates and home prices are steadily rising, a representative for the American Bankruptcy Institute stated in a press release that unemployment coupled with the stagnant housing market led to the increase. There are real indications that our economy is improving, but these numbers prove that many Americans, particularly Californians, are still struggling to overcome their debt. I believe the increase in filings also reflects how many debtors tried their hardest to avoid filing bankruptcy, but ultimately realized that in these times it is not a battle they could win. Source: california-bankruptcyattorney.com
A Texas Bankruptcy Lawyer’s Blog: Stern v. Marshall: The Texas Cases
Many are debating the breadth of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern. The arguments are interesting and, in some instances, mind-numbing. For today, I leave those arguments to others because I believe that the issue before me can be more simply, and practically, decided. It would be incredibly ironic for this Court to lack constitutional authority to finally determine the Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty and corporate waste claims against Smith and Sabolik (when they actually inserted themselves into Inc.’s bankruptcy case by filing a proof of claim) as the Supreme Court has clearly held in Stern, but to have constitutional authority to finally determine the Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty claims (arising from substantially the same acts or failures to act) against Linehan, the Outside Directors, and Letson, who chose not to involve themselves in the Debtors’ bankruptcy cases at all until they were forced to do so by the Trustee’s decision to sue them here. As a practical matter, this Court concludes that such a result is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Stern. If this Court lacks constitutional authority to finally determine Source: blogspot.com
San Diego Bankruptcy Lawyer Help
Another problem with the “Single Action Rule” is that it does not protect the borrower from being sued by a junior lienholder who either waives their right to foreclosure or sues after the property is foreclosed by the senior lienholder. Very frequently, a borrower will wind up owing a deficiency to a junior lienholder after the senior forecloses where the junior lien arose out of a home equity line of credit or from a refinance that included a second. The term that is often associated with this a “deficiency from a sold out junior lienholder.” However where there is a “sold out junior lienholder” there is case law that may still prohibit them from collecting on the deficiency. One California appellate case holds if the senior lienholder and the junior lienholder are one in the same than the foreclosure by the senior lienholder precludes the collection of a deficiency by the junior. The junior lienholder is deemed to have sold itself out and elected its sole remedy on CCP 726(a). Simon vs. Superior Court, 4 Cal.App.4th 63, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 428 (1992). Taking this one step further the California Court of Appeal recently held that where the senior and junior are owned by the same bank that an assignment to another lender of the junior after foreclosure does not allow the assignee to collect a deficiency. Bank of America vs. Mitchell, 2012 Westlaw 1177866 Cal.App. However the lender may circumvent the Simon and Bank of America vs. Mitchell results by assigning the junior trust deed prior to foreclosing on the senior trust deed. National Enterprises, Inc. v. Woods, 94 Cal.App.4th 1217, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 37 (2001). Source: endbillcollections.com
Unexpired contracts and leases, as well as all kinds of claims are also investigated. After this, the next step would involve holding a meeting of all of the creditors and other parties involved in the case. This meeting is also commonly called as the 341 meeting. The purpose of this meeting is for the court to hear all of the cases and the arguments that will be presented by all of the creditors. Such information is essential for the proceedings of the court to push through. After all of the arguments is heard, this would then be answered by the representative of the debtor in the case, which is the bankruptcy attorney. Soon after this meeting, it is expected that the proceedings would gain significant developments. This process usually occurs thirty days into the case. The next step would involve solving all the issues in the bankruptcy case. After all of the court related cases is already resolved, the debtor would then be required to propose to the creditors a reorganization plan, including how are the issues regarding the assets would be resolved. The trustee would also be asked on the best way for the lost assets to be recovered. The debtor in this case has the responsibility to convince the creditors to accept the reorganization plan. Source: ezinemark.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
Video: Chapter 11 Bankruptcy – Las Vegas Bankruptcy Attorney
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Las Vegas Bankruptcy Attorney
Unexpired contracts and leases, as well as all kinds of claims are also investigated. After this, the next step would involve holding a meeting of all of the creditors and other parties involved in the case. This meeting is also commonly called as the 341 meeting. The purpose of this meeting is for the court to hear all of the cases and the arguments that will be presented by all of the creditors. Such information is essential for the proceedings of the court to push through. After all of the arguments is heard, this would then be answered by the representative of the debtor in the case, which is the bankruptcy attorney. Soon after this meeting, it is expected that the proceedings would gain significant developments. This process usually occurs thirty days into the case. The next step would involve solving all the issues in the bankruptcy case. After all of the court related cases is already resolved, the debtor would then be required to propose to the creditors a reorganization plan, including how are the issues regarding the assets would be resolved. The trustee would also be asked on the best way for the lost assets to be recovered. The debtor in this case has the responsibility to convince the creditors to accept the reorganization plan. Source: ezinemark.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcylawyersco.com
Chapter 11 bankruptcy is frequently the protection businesses seek when reorganizing their debts. Normally , large corporation will seek Chapter 11 while small businesses will file for Chapter 7, or occasionally, Chapter 13. Individuals who are not eligible for Chapter 13 (exceeding $336,000 of unsecured and $1,010,650 of secured debts) occasionally seek the protection of a Chapter 11; though, the process is extremely cost inhibitive. The initial filing fee is over $800, and quarterly fees are required. Attorney fees are exorbitant in a Chapter 11, and most charge large retainers. Source: acbankruptcy.com
Bankruptcy filings rose sharply in the U.S. in February of 2012
Although many reports suggest that both employment rates and home prices are steadily rising, a representative for the American Bankruptcy Institute stated in a press release that unemployment coupled with the stagnant housing market led to the increase. There are real indications that our economy is improving, but these numbers prove that many Americans, particularly Californians, are still struggling to overcome their debt. I believe the increase in filings also reflects how many debtors tried their hardest to avoid filing bankruptcy, but ultimately realized that in these times it is not a battle they could win. Source: california-bankruptcyattorney.com
How To Find The Right Sacramento Bankruptcy Attorney For Resolving Your Financial Woes
Sufficient Availability And A Consistent Point Of Contact One very important feature to consider is the nature of the provided point of contact and this true whether you are searching for a reputable Tahoe bankruptcy attorney or a Sacramento bankruptcy lawyer. Having a consistent point of contact ensures that you will always have access to a legal professional who is knowledgeable about your case and is aware of all of the various nuances concerning your specific circumstances. Simply asking whether or not you will have a consistent point of contact throughout the duration of your case can alleviate a lot of the common frustrations in dealing with legal issues related to your finances. Source: lawmarketingsite.com
Sacramento CA Bankruptcy Lawyer
Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. 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Texas is the second largest state in the United States, and as you can imagine, there are plenty of San Antonio bankruptcy lawyers available for you to choose from. The tough part isn’t necessarily finding an attorney, it’s choosing one. You will find that by doing a bit of research, you can minimize your results down so that you’re left choosing from only the lawyers who will benefit you and your case. Source: ezinemark.com
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Bankruptcy Attorney Sacramento Serving Del Paso Heights Discusses Creditor Contact Which May Be Irksome, Unethical, Even Illegal
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Chapter 13 bankruptcy is a viable option for those who want to repay their debts, but require some form of immediate relief from collections and/or additional late payment penalties and interest. In general, Chapter 13 accomplishes this by arranging a legal debt workout (i.e., 3-5 year repayment plan) that will be reviewed, approved, and managed by the bankruptcy court. Source: maricopacountybankruptcyattorney.com
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My partner Andrea Wimmer and I volunteer at the Phoenix Bankruptcy Court Self Help Center, advising pro se debtors (people who file without an attorney) on their cases. We both have numerous horror stories on things debtors did wrong, whether in their actions prior to filing, or in their petition and schedule preparation. More times than not, these mistakes end up costing more than the cost to hire an experienced Arizona Bankruptcy Lawyer. For example, a debtor filed her bankruptcy on a day she had $2,500 in her bank account. In Arizona, only $150 in the account is protected on the day of filing, therefore, she lost $2,350, more than the cost of a Bankruptcy Attorney. Source: drbankruptcyaz.com
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One thing to be clear about from the onset is that when one spouse or ex-spouse files for bankruptcy, the other spouse’s financial obligations remain. What matters for the spouse or ex-spouse who did not file for bankruptcy is that they have a contract with the lender, and they are personally obligated under it. What this means is that, if a spouse or ex-spouse files for bankruptcy, they may be able to have their obligation to pay a loan discharged. But the discharge does not affect the other spouse’s obligation. Source: tennesseebankruptcylawoffice.com
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Perhaps one of the biggest reasons that individuals file for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy is medical costs. Harvard researchers estimate that approximately 62 percent of all personal bankruptcies in 2007 were attributed to health problems. And while the numbers have changed over the years, costly medical expenses are still major factors in American bankruptcy rates. Source: bankruptcytn.biz
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Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. 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Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. 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Nashville, Of Counsel Bankruptcy Attorney Required, Legal Jobs
legal jobs in nashville, tn – of counsel bankruptcy attorney required an established law firm based in california is seeking to expand its consumer law practice by affiliating with local attorneys or law firms in all the states of usa, on an of counsel basis. it is our intention to have an exclusive and mutually beneficial relationship with selected attorney. attorney should have an active consumer law practice. the background is filing for chapter seven and 13 bankruptcies will be a plus. the perfect candidate will have to make court appearances when necessary. compensation will be best in the field. if interested, please email a short letter of intent and resume. current license of state bar is mandatory. you can call mr. dave smith at 916-745-xxxx or email him at his email id for more info…. Source: livingtrustsonline.com
Mortgage Settlement Sprouts New Fears of Mortgage Scams in Tennessee
The scam works like this; a person calls the homeowner pretending to be either a bank employee or a third-party settlement administrator. The scammer tells the homeowner that they are eligible for a portion of the settlement and will try to convince the homeowner to provide the scammer with the homeowner’s bank information so they can deposit the settlement proceeds directly into the bank account. Source: nashvillebankruptcylaw.com
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The Tennessee Car Accident Lawyers at Michael D. Ponce & Associates Alert Public to New Bills Dealing with Tennessee Crashes Dealing with Uninsured/Unlicensed Motorists
These bills are being offered in part because of the overall statistics regarding Tennessee auto accidents. Every year, more than 1,000 people are killed and more than 50,000 people are injured because of these collisions according to the statistics kept by the State of Tennessee. These statistics have remained largely consistent in recent years. The Tennessee auto accident lawyers at Michael D. Ponce & Associates advise those motorists who do not have insurance to purchase coverage as soon as possible. Source: 9to6.com
Step Two: get yourself a car that will last all the way through your chapter 13 case. This most likely will mean that you will need to take out a loan to purchase a new, or newer, vehicle. The payments should last for the entire duration of the case. This way, you can either pay for the car loan yourself (outside the chapter 13 plan), or your chapter 13 plan monthly payment will cover the cost of paying for the car in full. Either way, you get to keep the newly purchased vehicle, and your unsecured creditors will simply receive a smaller level of repayment in your case. Additionally, you are obtaining the new vehicle with no impact on your monthly cash flow. This is because either your chapter 13 payment is being reduced doller-for-dollar by the new car payment, or your chapter 13 plan payment includes the car loan payment and your other creditors simply get less money. Source: bankruptcylawnetwork.com
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Chapter 12 bankruptcy is used by those who live on agricultural homesteads. If you declare Chapter 12 bankruptcy and the home in foreclosure is part of the farm, you can protect it from foreclosure while entering a repayment agreement with your creditors. However, if the home is on a separate parcel than the farm or the house is located in town while the farm is part of a separate property nearby, filing Chapter 12 bankruptcy to save the farm does not stop foreclosure of a separate, personal residence. Source: hbcservices.org
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Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: howtofilebankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyattorneysco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com
Loan Workout in Minnesota
If you are thinking about settling your debt in Minnesota it is important to keep tax consequences in mind when you are settling the debt. In most cases you are responsible for the phantom gains from debt settlement income. A good example of this is if you owe $20,000 on a credit card debt and you settle the debt for $10,000 the creditor can and probably will send you a 1099 form for $10,000. This means that you could owe additional money for the settled debt. The other thing to keep in mind when are settling debt is that you also should look at bankruptcy to see if one option is cheaper than the other. If you decide to settle debt it should be a business decision and it should be the cheaper alternative to bankruptcy. The nice thing about debt settlement as opposed to bankruptcy is that you do not have a trustee looking over your property and debt settlement is not public. If you are having issues with debt give our office a call at 952-294-0144. Source: minnesotasbankruptcylawyer.com
Nothing found for Minneapolis
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How to Get a Cheap Minnesota Bankruptcy Attorney in Minneapolis
Bankruptcy can be a choice for people who have have had the IRS repossess some of their valuables. While bankruptcy is a big hit to your credit history, it can be the only option. Read this guide in order to know more when it comes to filing bankruptcy as well as the consequences of doing so. The same goes for people using a Trust Deed.Tired of always having collection agencies call you? Debt that you can no longer control can be overwhelming. Have the safety of bankruptcy around you while you get your finances back under control, can give some measure of relief.No matter how messed up things are as you file for bankruptcy, it is important that you stay honest. It is never a good idea to lie about debt or assets. And it is illegal. If you lie when it comes to your assets and debts, you might end up going to prison.If you are facing financial difficulty, it may not be wise to go through with a divorce. When many people divorce, they have to pursue a bankruptcy when the realities of the costs comes to light. Reconsidering divorce can be a very smart option.Do your homework so you thoroughly understand the laws pertaining to bankruptcy before you file. For instance, you may not be aware that a filer is forbidden from transferring assets from his or her name for one full year before the petition is filed. It is also illegal for someone who files for bankruptcy to drastically increase their debts on credit cards immediately before filing.This article has made it known that bankruptcy is something you may be able to turn to. Of course, it may not be best for all situations and can even make your credit matters worse. Staying informed on how to manage this situation could prevent you from experiencing headaches and it can also help you keep your valuables. Source: marsill.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcyforumco.com
Gambling and Bankruptcy In Minnesota
I see clients everyday who have issues with gambling and may be have to file for bankruptcy protection to cover those gambling losses. In some cases these clients spend every free dollar on different forms of gambling. Some of these clients like casinos, lottery tickets, scratch offs, pull tabs, and horse racing. The problem is when people gamble more than they can afford, so it is not an enjoyable pastime, but becomes an addiction. Once people are addicted to gambling it affects every aspect of their life, including ability to save for retirement. Our office always advises clients that if they file for bankruptcy and continue gambling the bankruptcy will just be a temporary solution to their problems. If they continue to gamble they will find the debts will continue to mount even after the bankruptcy, and the paychecks will continue to disappear a Twin Cities gambling establishments. It seems that Minnesotans already have plenty of gambling options and do not need to have the State authorize any more ways for people to spend their hard earned money gambling. Source: bolinskelaw.com
Minnesota Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Lawyers
Nicest Person is a place for people in Charlotte to find and vote on acts of niceness. We run a contest to figure who is the nicest person each week. Contests end on Friday at 4:00 PM. If you are a recipient of a nice act, consider posting about it. It’s a better way to say “Thank You”. Source: nicestperson.com
Bankruptcy Attorney Job in Minneapolis, Minnesota
If this opportunity is of interest to you, please feel free to contact us. We would be happy to speak with you about this position and/or review your resume. You can email your resume to jobs@bcgsearch.com for immediate review, apply for our internal review by clicking the link below, or call us at the below number. We respond toall inquiries the same business day we receive them, and assisting you is our highest priority. Please be assured that submitting your materials to us will be for our internal review only and none of your materials will be forwarded to any employers. Of course, all inquiries are kept strictly confidential. Contact the Following BCG Attorney Search Office: Chicago 200 South Wacker Drive, 31st Floor Chicago, Illinois 60606 p (312) 321-9411 Source: bcgsearch.com
Gambling and Bankruptcy In Minnesota
If you are thinking about filing for bankruptcy, you may not be sure where to start. Finding the right bankruptcy attorney to handle your case could be the best way to deal with your bankruptcy questions. In the meantime, before filing for bankruptcy, you might consider other alternatives. A bankruptcy will remain on your record for a long period of time. However, there is a good chance that if you are thinking about filing for bankruptcy, then your credit is probably in bad shape already. A bankruptcy could be your chance to relieve your debts completely and give you a fresh start. According to the revised Bankruptcy Code, an individual is required to attend credit counseling to discuss other options, 180 days prior to the bankruptcy filing case. If bankruptcy is right for you, then you might want to look into what chapter of bankruptcy applies to your case. One of the more popular chapters is a chapter 7 bankruptcy where your debts can be completely liquidated. However, in order to qualify for this chapter, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) demands that individuals take the means test before filing a chapter 7 bankruptcy. The other common chapter is the chapter 13. Individuals who file for this chapter generally have a steady income and will set up a payment plan to pay off their debts. If you are looking to hire a bankruptcy attorney, it would be a good idea to hire someone you can be in direct contact with, versus a paralegal from a large law firm. Once you have selected a bankruptcy lawyer, you could then set up a meeting time to discuss your bankruptcy case and your best strategy going forward. Your attorney may also provide you with the means test. The cost for a bankruptcy attorney will also vary. Some attorneys require a flat fee, while others will let you pay them in installments. The fees will also depend on your location. In some instances, you may be able to file for free, but if you decide to file for a chapter 7, then you will most likely have to pay your attorney fees before your case is filed. In a chapter 13, your attorney fees may be included in your payment plan that you have laid out in your file. You can talk with your attorney about fees and the associated costs with filing for bankruptcy to get a better idea of what you will be paying up front. Once you have a bankruptcy attorney secured, you may then direct your creditors to his or her office. Your bankruptcy attorney will most likely handle all your creditor calls on your behalf and the automatic stay will go into effect. This automatic stay prohibits creditors from contacting you to harass you about your debts. Creditors are most likely held liable if they violate the automatic stay in which case you could be awarded for punitive damages. When your file is submitted, you may get a letter in the mail for a creditor meeting, also known as the 341 meeting. This meeting will enable the trustee of your file to ensure with you that your file is truthful and that you understand the terms of a bankruptcy. Your bankruptcy attorney will probably go over all of your listed debts with you prior to this meeting so that you can be prepared. Your answers in the meeting may be recorded, but on average, the meeting will last only approximately 10 minutes. Your trustee may then decide which assets are exempt and which are non-exempt. If there are assets listed that are considered non-exempt, these properties may be sold. In a chapter 13 bankruptcy, you may enter a three to five year plan that involves paying back your creditors over time. While you are filing for bankruptcy, it would be a good idea to discontinue using your credit cards as well. If you use these, your creditor may utilize this against you in a lawsuit by challenging your right to a debt discharge. In most bankruptcy cases, your creditors will have sixty days from your meeting to challenge the discharge of your debts. If no lawsuits are filed, you may receive a discharge of your debts. In a chapter 13 bankruptcy, you can be notified anywhere from thirty to sixty days after your last payment and the trustee declares that your plan has been completed. Keep in mind that not all debts can be discharged in a bankruptcy, including student loans and specific taxes. Discharged debts usually depend on certain bankruptcy provisions and whether your creditor persuaded the judge to not discharge a particular debt. In any bankruptcy case, it would be a good idea to hire an attorney who can help you through the bankruptcy process so that you can hopefully be debt and stress free. Source: lawadvicenow.com Source: chapter12bankruptcyco.com Source: filebankruptcyco.com Source: filebankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcyquestionsco.com Source: bankruptcyco.org Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcyattorneysco.com
Minnesota Bankruptcy Attorney
Most of people that need help from Minnesota bankruptcy attorney only try to find them after they can’t handle their finance problem. That’s so wrong. The Minnesota bankruptcy attorney should be your best friend, which means there is lot of help that you can get from them regarding your finance condition. So, it’s not that they can help you when you want to declare bankruptcy. Before you decide to do this last resort, you also can use their help to deal with your finance problem. Why? If you start to find Minnesota bankruptcy attorney when your finance problem got worse, that would be waste of your time, energy and money. Even if you use top and best Minnesota bankruptcy attorney, you won’t be able to restore your finance condition and maybe, if you choose wrong attorney, you will get more finance problem. So, before your finance problem got worse, it even better, if you find information about best Minnesota bankruptcy attorney that you can use and always keep updated with that information when your finance is in good condition, so, whenever you need to do the last resort to save your finance, you will know professional where you can ask for help. By hiring Minnesota bankruptcy attorney earlier, the attorney also have enough time to evaluate your case. That means they have more time to find some of important point that you can use to fix your finance condition. Of course, if you hire Minnesota bankruptcy attorney when you have good finance condition, you will be able to pay them without problem. Besides hiring Minnesota bankruptcy attorney at good time, you also need to find more about what they can give and do for you. For this one, you can use lot of reference that you can find around you. You can ask your friend or family that has experience with the attorney that you want to hire or you can read online review and testimonial about them. You also can check their record on the ABA to find more about their career and case result. Don’t choose only one lawyer. You need to look at many lawyer references and compare them, so, you can find the one that suitable with your case. Nowadays, there’re many Minnesota bankruptcy attorney that only concentrate on one specific area of law. Therefore, it’s important to find Minnesota bankruptcy attorney that suitable with your case. For this one, you also can use many references like mentioned above, or you can use professional help to find them. One of best professional help is asking the recommendation from many law firms. You can use their online service to get this information and choose the best one. Knowing the process of bankruptcy court is also important. Before you hire Minnesota bankruptcy attorney that you find, it would be better, if you spend a day or two at the court. Pay attention to the process, so, you will know what you will face later. It’s also useful, so, you can avoid scam that may happen when you choose wrong Minnesota bankruptcy attorney. Most of Minnesota bankruptcy attorney also provide free consultation service. Use this! This is important, because you can get lot of information about what you should do about your case and how they capable in helping you. You also can use this free consultation service to find more reference about the Minnesota bankruptcy attorney that you want to hire as well as base to compare them with other Minnesota bankruptcy attorney. And the most important thing to do is ask a lot. You’re the client and you don’t know about this matter like your attorney that has gone through years in law school. So, you don’t need to be shame to be like stupid, as long you get clear information about what you’re dealing with. And it would be better, if you have two or more professional advice. You can compare them and maybe you can find more about what you should do about your problem. The last thing you need to care is the price. In this world, you will get what you paid. Therefore, if you pay your attorney cheaply, you also get cheap service from them. Therefore, like mentioned before, try to hire the Minnesota bankruptcy attorney at the right time. When is the right time? For this one, you’re the one that know you finance condition. You can use lot of information in the internet to find about your finance condition and decide when you have to hire best Minnesota bankruptcy attorney with right price. Source: coloradobankruptcycourts.com
How to Get a Cheap Minnesota Bankruptcy Attorney
after attorney bad credit Bankruptcy bankruptcy bankruptcy attorney bankruptcy lawyer business chapter chapter 7 chapter 13 child custody cost court credit credit card credit card debt credit cards credit counseling credit debt credit repair credit report credit score debt debt consolidation debt free debt help debt management debt relief debt settlement debt settlement programs debt solutions divorce dui file filing filing bankruptcy finance foreclosure get out of debt home law lawyer legal legitimate debt settlement companies loan loans money mortgage personal Source: businesslawyerbankruptcy.com
Former Minnesota Twin’s checks are garnished for credit debt
Hernandez reportedly owes a bank more than $450,000 from a promissory note and a line of credit. The court has ordered the garnished wages in the past when he was with the Nationals and the Astros, but Hernandez was a free agent when he played for the Nationals, which presented issues for garnishment. And, the Astros cut him shortly after the writ of garnishment was issued. There are ways that Hudson residents can avoid or stop wage garnishment. Source: hudsonbankruptcyattorneys.com
Why You Should Hire Minnesota Bankruptcy Lawyers
Hire the services of Minneapolis bankruptcy lawyers to safeguard your rights. They are good lerned to safeguard your authorised rights and bargain a satisfactory agreement of properties and debts. Legal illustration is a must instead you are expected to be taken value of in unjust ways. Bankruptcy laws make sure a turn of insurance in justice that Minneapolis lawyers understand. The who come in in to bankruptcy proceedings, unrepresented by a counsel might find themselves victimized by immoral creditors. Ignorance of the law is nonetheless other reason because you need authorised illustration in bankruptcy cases. Most people who request for bankruptcy insurance have definitely no thought of filing the vital paperwork. As a matter of fact, courts have fearful filing mandate that median adults are not wakeful of. Minneapolis bankruptcy lawyers will record the correct documentation at the right time and is to right reasons. They comprehend their work well. They are good capable with the many aspects of bankruptcy. Source: forbankruptcylawyers.com
Taking some time to research some of the different bankruptcy lawyers either online or in your local area can give you some detailed information on how the proceedings will go and what documentation that your San Diego bankruptcy lawyers might need to plead your case. You must make sure that you always have all required documentation with you on your court date. Many times when San Diego bankruptcy lawyers have many standing relationships with some of the creditors, lawyers themselves and can easily work out deals without even going in front of the judge. Source: familylawyertorontox.com
Video: What Property Can I Keep In Bankruptcy? – San Diego Bankruptcy Attorney
Basics of San Diego Bankruptcy Attorneys
There are instances where they can help you reorganize your finances and deal with creditors maturely. Remember, there are creditors who will bully you to the point of breaking down and if you have bankruptcy attorney, he/ she will be in a position to prevent such from happening. In addition, laws keep changing as the years go by and having a lawyer will help you to know what laws have changed in respect to bankruptcy cases. Source: attorneyandlawyer.net
What You Must Know About San Diego Bankruptcy Lawyer
Secondly, bankruptcy lawyers San Diego will aid you in saving thousands of dollars you would have wasted unknowingly into clearing your debts. During such times, people are normally resort to desperate measures to stop the nagging of creditors, for example borrowing from Paul to pay Jane. When you are spending money that you do not have in the first place only worsens everything. You can be sure that the Bankruptcy Lawyers San Diego hired will guide you on how to pay off your creditors without getting into more debts. Source: blogovino.com
Small San Diego music locker company seeks bankruptcy protection
According to court documents, the San Diego-based company owes nearly $1.5 million in legal fees. The company has been fighting a copyright infringement lawsuit for more than four years after EMI Music accused the music locker service of failing to remove pirated songs from its customers’ online accounts. Although MP3tunes and other similar services are not held accountable for checking whether or not customers are uploading pirated music to their lockers, EMI Music claims that it warned MP3tunes that the company and its customers were sharing songs illegally. Source: bankruptcysandiegoattorney.com
Bankruptcyattorneys.org Estimated Value $540.00 USD
Access to .ORG WHOIS information is provided to assist persons in determining the contents of a domain name registration record in the Public Interest Registry registry database. The data in this record is provided by Public Interest Registry for informational purposes only, and Public Interest Registry does not guarantee its accuracy. This service is intended only for query-based access. You agree that you will use this data only for lawful purposes and that, under no circumstances will you use this data to: (a) allow, enable, or otherwise support the transmission by e-mail, telephone, or facsimile of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations to entities other than the data recipient’s own existing customers; or (b) enable high volume, automated, electronic processes that send queries or data to the systems of Registry Operator, a Registrar, or Afilias except as reasonably necessary to register domain names or modify existing registrations. All rights reserved. Public Interest Registry reserves the right to modify these terms at any time. By submitting this query, you agree to abide by this policy. Domain ID:D83756540-LROR Domain Name:BANKRUPTCYATTORNEYS.ORG Created On:18-Feb-2002 21:30:31 UTC Last Updated On:04-Nov-2011 23:00:23 UTC Expiration Date:18-Feb-2013 21:30:31 UTC Sponsoring Registrar:Register.com, Inc. (R71-LROR) Status:CLIENT TRANSFER PROHIBITED Registrant ID:0209826cfb1c2638 Registrant Name:Domain Discreet Privacy Service Registrant Organization:ATTN: bankruptcyattorneys.org Registrant Street1:12808 Gran Bay Pkwy Registrant Street2: Registrant Street3: Registrant City:West Jacksonville Registrant State/Province:FL Registrant Postal Code:32258 Registrant Country:US Registrant Phone:+1.9027492701 Registrant Phone Ext.: Registrant FAX: Registrant FAX Ext.: Registrant Email:498f9f250a1612200af18a48c51ff62b@domaindiscreet.com Admin ID:092152034f4a7056 Admin Name:Domain Discreet Admin Organization:ATTN: bankruptcyattorneys.org Admin Street1:Rua Dr. Brito Camara, n 20, 1 Admin Street2: Admin Street3: Admin City:Funchal Admin State/Province:Madeira Admin Postal Code:9000-039 Admin Country:PT Admin Phone:+361.19027495331 Admin Phone Ext.: Admin FAX: Admin FAX Ext.: Admin Email:4a34f4980a16121f2b2255254556ef7c@domaindiscreet.com Admin ID:5067561cfacc3991 Admin Name:Domain Discreet Privacy Service Admin Organization:ATTN: bankruptcyattorneys.org Admin Street1:12808 Gran Bay Pkwy Admin Street2: Admin Street3: Admin City:West Jacksonville Admin State/Province:FL Admin Postal Code:32258 Admin Country:US Admin Phone:+1.9027492701 Admin Phone Ext.: Admin FAX: Admin FAX Ext.: Admin Email:498f9f220a16122065cb33e418df88fd@domaindiscreet.com Tech ID:7313017cfb615747 Tech Name:Domain Discreet Privacy Service Tech Organization:ATTN: bankruptcyattorneys.org Tech Street1:12808 Gran Bay Pkwy Tech Street2: Tech Street3: Tech City:West Jacksonville Tech State/Province:FL Tech Postal Code:32258 Tech Country:US Tech Phone:+1.9027492701 Tech Phone Ext.: Tech FAX: Tech FAX Ext.: Tech Email:498f9f260a1612201d084c3e95f1eac6@domaindiscreet.com Name Server:NS.BANKRUPTCYATTORNEYS.ORG Name Server:NS1.BANKRUPTCYATTORNEYS.ORG Name Server: Name Server: Name Server: Name Server: Name Server: Name Server: Name Server: Name Server: Name Server: Name Server: Name Server: DNSSEC:Unsigned Source: widestat.com
Tribune Co. continues through Chapter 11 bankruptcy process
Tribune Co., a national media company that owns local news outlets including television stations in San Diego and Los Angeles, as well as The Los Angeles Times, is currently going through Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Last week, as part of the bankruptcy process, a federal judge ruled that Tribune was allowed to pay up to $45 million in bonuses to company managers as part of an incentive program. Source: jdescalso.com
The San Diego Bankruptcy Lawyers at the Golden State Law Group Offering Free …
Consumers who are already experiencing these types of problems because of new credit accounts that they have opened are further advised that the San Diego bankruptcy attorneys at the Golden State Law Group will provide them with a free initial consultation. The purpose of this free initial consultation is to conduct a thorough review of the consumers overall financial picture so that appropriate recommendations can be made towards bringing about an end to that persons financial difficulties. Source: universalautoloans.com
San Diego bankruptcy Attorney
Post bankruptcy counseling encourages and organizes people and their finances after this financial and legal ordeal. Self-esteem is usually very low making it hard to get motivated toward a better life. With the help of personal bankruptcy counselors, a person can get their finances organized, which inevitably boosts self-esteem and encourages toward better financial decisions. Partnering with a friend or family member to start new habits can greatly improve the future. Finding a balance between keeping an entire paycheck in cash and spending it unwisely through debit or credit cards can be difficult as it is a personal decision. Making a plan for the execution of financial goals with personal bankruptcy counselors not only motivates, but helps a person understand the importance of each step of the process toward financial freedom. Understanding personal habits leading to financial ruin allow for better future planning including savings for emergencies. Deciding on a good financial system through the many experts out there is the first step toward financial freedom and well as simple survival. Sticking with one system (as long as it works) increases the chances for success. Taking advantage of post bankruptcy counseling offers the required structure and knowledge for a person to be successful and financial management. Counseling may include tracking expenses, using an envelope system, and changing habits. Making these changes may be difficult, but with professional planning success is just a matter of time. Due to the overwhelming rate of bankruptcy filers failing to keep it together financially, focus and professional help is key to success. Credit card companies preying on financially uneducated and vulnerable people leads to more problems including a second filing. Coming to grips with the reality of a situation leads to a successful plan which only using credit cards in emergencies. Though the economic trend of the current time is an indicator of the cost of living and availability of good paying jobs, it is not an excuse for poor money management. Personal bankruptcy counselors determine the fine line between unavoidable situations and personally invoked circumstances. This definition further aids in determining the required changes for financial success. These changes include eliminating interest earning accounts or at least lowering the interest rates if at all possible. Some instances where loans are still acceptable after filing include car loans, mortgages, and school loans. Post bankruptcy counseling may suggest debt consolidation to lower interest rates and make monthly payment easier. Caution may also be advised toward the type of company hired for consolidation unless a person can accomplish that task himself. Consolidating includes calling current loan companies and finding out the payoff balance. After adding all the debts together a person should find a loan with the lowest interest rate. Even though most of the debt discharged by filing, in some cases people choose to keep some items in order to build credit. Jesus answered and said unto them, Verily I say unto you, If ye have faith, and doubt not, ye shall not only do this [which is done] to the fig tree, but also if ye shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea; it shall be done. (Mathew 21:21) Once a budget is determined by calculating net monthly income minus living expenses reality of the amount available to spend becomes evident. Realizing how much a person might pay in overdraft fees, late fees, interest rates, and unexpected expenses may become alarming and therefore motivate a person to avoid these expenses at all cost. Careful budgeting and eliminating the unnecessary monthly expenses at least for a while can dramatically aid in developing a sound financial plan. During this time of not paying on things such as cell phones, cable TV, additional car payments, and new clothing purchases can be effectively used to pay off debt or develop savings for emergency situations in the future. In addition, using barter and trade services with neighbors or co-workers can additionally save money leading to lower living expense. Personal bankruptcy counselors may have suggestions for organizations or individuals who can help. In addition to great money management a person needs to maintain steady work in order to prove to lenders the seriousness of personal change after bankruptcy. Even with steady work a lender may require a deposit of money for a loan, which may be granted by friends or family, however careful documentation of where the money comes from is crucial to lenders. Grants may also be available through private and government organizations. Though a person may make many dramatic changes in lifestyle and spending habits, most lenders will not accept applications until two years after discharge. Finding creative ways to get through life without the use of loans may build even more character than proper money management. Debt causes stress and stress causes health problems, which cost money. Living life carefully decreases the instance of accidents, illness, and mistakes which all cost money. Post bankruptcy counseling can pinpoint these situations and offer solutions to harmful habits as well as aid in creating beneficial situations to enhance life. An enhance life will lead to better self-concept and therefore motivate a person toward accomplishing goals and dreams. More than half of people who file will file again within five years, which leads to a more difficult situation to get out of due to losing more possessions and lessening the probability of future financial success. Personal financial counselors can aid in drawing up a plan in order to help a person stay on track. Connecting with people who have a good handle on money management influences even repeat filers toward a more fruitful life. Source: christianet.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com
Car Loan Before Bankruptcy In San Diego
In California, when you buy a car or truck, in most cases you buy from retail dealer. The retail dealer gives you a car or truck in exchange for a contract, a piece of paper, that you sign agreeing to make certain payments to the dealer over a period of months or years. The dealer then attempts to sell that piece of paper (and the right to a stream of payments) to a finance company. The dealer has usually pre-approved you for the loan and fully expects that the finance company will buy the contract. But if you file bankruptcy immediately after driving your car off the lot, the finance company may get wind of your bankruptcy filing and refuse to buy the contract from the dealer. To protect itself, a retail dealer typically will have a provision in its contract specifying a period of time, usually 10 days, during which it can cancel the contract if the dealer is unable to sell the contract to a finance company. If the contract is cancelled, you’ll have to return the vehicle to the dealer. Therefore, before filing a San Diego bankruptcy case, it is imperative to have your San Diego bankruptcy attorney read the vehicle loan contract to make sure you are filing your case after the dealer’s right of cancellation has passed. Source: sandiego-bankruptcylaw.com
San Diego Bankruptcy Lawyer Divorce & Filing Bankruptcy Help
The last common question for discussion has to do with the relative timing of bankruptcy relative to their divorce. Specifically, many clients ask whether it is advisable that they wait until the divorce is finalized before filing for bankruptcy. While there is no easy hard and fast answer to this question, several key points should be considered. The first key point has to do with urgency. If one needs to stop a wage garnishment or a pending foreclosure it probably is not advisable to wait. On the other hand waiting for a finalized divorce decree along with an attendant Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) and order thereon might favorably affect property exemptions, controversy over what is and is not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and qualifications under the means test. Qualifications under the means test might affect whether the client can file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy or not and what the client is required to pay into a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. Each case will be unique and the pros and cons will need to be carefully weighed by an experienced bankruptcy attorney. With bankruptcy the timing of a case is crucial, so an early evaluation is recommended to insure the best outcome in a given case. Also, certain planning opportunities may require timely and close cooperation of the client’s family law and bankruptcy law attorneys. Source: endbillcollections.com
San Diego Bankruptcy Attorney
It is just dawn on you that your start-up business is not generating much revenue as anticipated. To add insult to injury, they have neither paid off debts to their creditors. These can range from suppliers to financiers. You know with certainty that the more time needed to clear what you owe, plus interest and penalties continue to incur. Avoid answering calls and registered letters does not help your progress. We strongly recommend that when faced with huge financial debts, they immediately engage the services of a bankruptcy attorney in San Diego. This applies to business owners and individuals. Source: caligulashots.com
San Diego Bankruptcy Legal Professional
If you have doubt with regards to which attorney to decide on, you might take the suggestion of other attorneys to locate the right individual bankruptcy attorney for you. Even a personal lawyer may possibly propose someone who is skilled and experienced in the area of personal bankruptcy legislation. You can also visit personal bankruptcy courts if you get time. This will support you to understand how the method of personal bankruptcy capabilities, and will also give you a detail understanding of the variety of particular person you should make use of to struggle for your case. Source: savingcashnow.com
The San Diego Bankruptcy Lawyers at the Golden State Law Group Offering Free …
Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. 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